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 An implicit moral of Peter Shane’s insightful Disappearing        
Democracy1 is that Laurence Tribe made a key strategic error in the 
first sentence of his oral argument in Bush v. Palm Beach County 
Canvassing Board by directing the Supreme Court’s attention away 
from the Due Process Clause.2 Rather than simply dismissing Bush’s 
due process arguments,3 Tribe should have argued that both sub-
stantive and procedural due process in fact required the Florida Su-
preme Court to protect the right of every Florida voter to have his or 
her vote counted. The central message of Disappearing Democracy is 
that the due process problems with stopping the Florida recounts 
were far more serious than any equal protection problem with letting 
them continue. 
 Disappearing Democracy offers two major arguments. The first 
argument focuses on the Reduction-of-Representation Clause of Sec-
tion 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. That clause requires a reduc-
tion in a state’s population base for apportionment purposes when a 
state denies or abridges “the right to vote at any election for the 
choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United 
States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial offi-
cers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof.”4 Shane 
                                                                                                                    
 * Kenneth and Harle Montgomery Professor of Public Interest Law, Stanford Law 
School. I presented some of the ideas in this Comment at Florida State University College 
of Law’s live symposium on March 23, 2001; others reflect several months’ additional 
thought about Bush v. Gore, the Supreme Court, and the right to vote. Many of these ideas 
came from my collaborative work with Sam Issacharoff and Rick Pildes, both on our com-
prehensive casebook, THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL 
PROCESS (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY], and on our shorter casebook, 
WHEN ELECTIONS GO BAD: THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY AND THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 
2000 (rev. ed. 2001) [hereinafter WHEN ELECTIONS GO BAD]. I also appreciate several sug-
gestions from Viola Canales. 
 1. Peter M. Shane, Disappearing Democracy: How Bush v. Gore Undermined the 
Federal Right to Vote for Presidential Electors, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 535 (2001). 
 2. Tr. of Oral Argument at 44-45, Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 
U.S. 70 (2000) (No. 00-836), available at http://election2000.stanford.edu/00-836.pdf (“I 
think I would want to note at the outset that the alleged due process violation which keeps 
puffing up and then disappearing . . . is really not before the Court.”). 
 3. For a brief discussion of this issue, see infra text accompanying notes 76-78. 
 4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. More precisely, Section 2 requires that a state’s 
population basis be reduced when the right to vote: 
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argues that implicit in this clause is a “background understanding 
that individual citizens in the several states would now be guaran-
teed some form of franchise in presidential elections, as well as in 
House contests.”5 This conclusion is reinforced, Shane suggests, both 
by the Privileges or Immunities Clause and by subsequent doctrinal 
and constitutional developments.6 
 The second argument focuses on the Due Process Clause.7 Shane 
points out that voting is a species of liberty (or property) interest.8 
Vote tabulation is a “governmental process for making adjudicatory 
decisions”9: whether a citizen cast a valid ballot; for whom each valid 
ballot was cast; and ultimately who has won an election. Shane then 
shows how fairly straightforward procedural due process analysis 
leads to the conclusion that inaccuracies in machine-only tabulation 
of ballots required Florida to have some manual reexamination proc-
ess.10 The recount ordered by the Florida Supreme Court was neces-
sary to bring Florida’s otherwise inadequate adjudicatory process 
into compliance with the Due Process Clause. 
 In this Comment, I make three points. The first two focus on 
Shane’s analysis. I am skeptical that Section 2 necessarily trans-
formed the process by which electors are selected into “one in which 
individual citizens must be allowed to participate” through popular 
elections.11 To my mind, substantive due process is a stronger vehicle 
for safeguarding that right. In a related vein, without resolving, or at 
least analyzing, the nature of the liberty interest at stake in voting 
rights cases, it is impossible fully to flesh out the procedural due 
process issue. The final point is more speculative, and focuses on a 
due process claim that Shane does not discuss: George W. Bush’s al-
legation that the Florida Supreme Court’s decisions changed the ex-
                                                                                                                    
is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years 
of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for par-
ticipation in rebellion, or other crime [by the] proportion which the number of 
such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one 
years of age in such State. 
Id. Some aspects of Section 2—such as its protection only of men’s right to vote and its age 
reference—have presumably been superseded by later constitutional amendments. See id. 
amend. XIX (forbidding discrimination in voting on account of sex); id. amend. XXVI (giv-
ing 18 year-olds the right to vote). Other aspects, such as its implicit approval of felon dis-
enfranchisement statutes, see Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974), remain both vital 
and controversial. See THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY, supra note *, at 21-40 (discussing the 
question of felon disenfranchisement). 
 5. Shane, supra note 1, at 544. 
 6. See id. at 546-47. 
 7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.  
 8. Shane, supra note 1, at 562. 
 9. Id. at 552. 
 10. Id. at 562-68.  
 11. Id. at 539. 
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isting law unfairly.12 Even the three Justices who pressed the Article 
II theory—that the Florida Supreme Court had infringed the legisla-
ture’s federally inviolable prerogative to determine the manner in 
which a state’s electors are appointed13—ignored a squarely pertinent 
line of due process cases. I suggest that the Court had several rea-
sons, none of them admirable, for relying on the Equal Protection 
Clause instead. In particular, reliance on the Due Process Clause 
would have made clear what the Court’s invocation of equal protec-
tion worked to obscure: that the only litigants whose interests the 
Court’s decision actually served were George W. Bush and Dick Che-
ney, and not any of the voters in Florida. 
I.   THE FUZZINESS OF SECTION 2 
 Shane’s argument regarding the constitutional consequences of 
the Reduction-of-Representation Clause can be described as quasi-
originalist. The central concern that animated the drafters was that 
the readmitted Southern states would have their black population 
included fully in a state’s apportionment base, thereby increasing 
their relative number of House seats (and concomitantly, electoral 
votes), but would disenfranchise black citizens, thereby enhancing 
the political power of white, unreconstructed Democrats (and dimin-
ishing the power of the Northern Republicans who then controlled 
Congress). Shane argues that “[s]o long as we interpret the Constitu-
tion as making popular involvement in presidential elections a state 
legislative prerogative,”14 Southern states could accomplish precisely 
their goal of using their black inhabitants as inert ballast for enhanc-
ing white political strength (the very effect of the now-repealed 
“three-fifths” clause): 
All that need happen in a Southern state intent on maintaining 
white control of presidential elector appointments is for the major-
ity-white legislature to institute or maintain a practice of having 
itself select slates of presidential electors without any popular vote 
involvement.15 
 I think Shane’s argument focuses too narrowly on the language 
about the right to vote in elections for presidential and vice-
presidential electors. In light of the full list of covered elections, I 
think it is more sensible to read Section 2 conditionally. If the state 
employs an election, then it cannot deny or abridge the right to vote 
in that election without incurring a reduction in its apportionment 
base. 
                                                                                                                    
 12. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 73 (2000). 
 13. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 112-15 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).  
 14. Shane, supra note 1, at 544. 
 15. Id. 
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 The Reduction-of-Representation Clause specifies denials or 
abridgements of the right to vote in five distinct sets of elections as 
triggering a reduction of representation.16 In addition to the federal 
offices on which Shane focuses, the Clause also covers elections for 
state legislators, the state “Executive,” and state judicial officers.17 
But many states, both in the 1860s and today, do not select their 
judges through popular elections. Thus, they consistently and cate-
gorically deny the right to vote for state judicial officers to every in-
habitant.18 Moreover, “[t]here is no provision of the United States 
Constitution or any of its amendments which either expressly or im-
pliedly dictates the method a State must use to select its Governor.”19 
Several states have constitutional provisions that authorize the state 
legislature to choose the governor if no candidate receives an outright 
majority of the votes cast in a popular election.20 These provisions, 
too, might be described as denying or abridging a right to vote. But it 
would be absurd to conclude that Section 2 was intended to strip 
states with appointed judiciaries or legislatively selected governors of 
all their representation in Congress and all but two of their electoral 
votes. Put somewhat differently, Section 2 is relative, not absolute. 
State law defines whether there is to be an election, but once a state 
decides to fill an office through popular balloting, it faces a strong 
federal incentive to treat citizens equally. 
 Moreover, the danger that concerns Shane is relatively remote. 
The likelihood of a state’s abolishing popular election altogether was 
quite low even in 1868 (and essentially nonexistent today). As Shane 
notes, by the time of the Fourteenth Amendment, all states used 
popular election to select their electors.21 To disenfranchise black 
voters in presidential elections without losing congressional seats, a 
state would also have to disenfranchise white voters who had long 
enjoyed (and exercised—voter turnout in the nineteenth century was 
far higher than today) the right to vote. Making that change would 
be politically risky.22 As Justice Holmes observed, “[a] thing which 
                                                                                                                    
 16. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.  
 17. Id.  
 18. Of course, the Constitution requires every state to use elections to fill House seats. 
See id. art. I, § 2. 
 19. Fortson v. Morris, 385 U.S. 231, 234 (1966). 
 20. Morris noted then-existing constitutional provisions in Georgia, Mississippi, and 
Vermont and also referred to constitutional or statutory provisions in thirty-eight other 
states that would turn to legislative selection if the popular election produced a tie. Id. at 
234-35. 
 21. Shane, supra note 1, at 545.  
 22. That does not mean it would be impossible. During Redemption, Southern states 
passed disenfranchising provisions that aimed at black voters but also swept large num-
bers of white voters off the rolls. But even in those cases, the states did not strip most 
white voters of the right to vote. Pamela S. Karlan, Loss and Redemption: Voting Rights at 
the Turn of a Century, 50 VAND. L. REV. 291, 294 (1997). 
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you have enjoyed and used as your own for a long time, whether 
property or an opinion, takes root in your being and cannot be torn 
away without your resenting the act and trying to defend yourself, 
however you came by it.”23 The legislators who voted for such a 
change would likely face the angry consequences at their next elec-
tion. And of course, it is not entirely clear that the state legislatures 
would either have, or perceive themselves as having, the right to 
make such a drastic change through ordinary legislation.24 There is 
no reason to suppose that nineteenth-century state legislatures 
would view themselves as receiving powers from the federal govern-
ment that were denied them by their own state constitutions. More-
over, I do not read the Bush v. Gore per curiam’s remark that “[t]he 
State, of course, after granting the franchise in the special context of 
Article II, can take back the power to appoint electors”25 as necessar-
ily going that far. A state legislature that acts beyond its authority 
under the state constitution arguably no longer is the state. And if a 
constitutional amendment were required to abolish popular balloting 
for presidential electors—as would be the case in many states—it 
would be hard to imagine the plebiscitary ratification process in 
which a majority of the electorate would vote to disenfranchise itself. 
 Finally, there is little reason to think that creating an affirmative 
right to vote in elections to choose electors adds anything very sig-
nificant to the operation of Section 2, assuming that Section 2 works 
at all.26 Section 2 protects the right to vote in state legislative elec-
tions.27 If that right were fully respected—and of course it was not28—
then it often would not matter to the outcome whether a state used 
popular election or legislative selection to pick its presidential elec-
tors. In a state with a white majority and racially polarized voting, 
the outcome of a winner-take-all popular vote will be that the white-
preferred candidate gets all the state’s electoral votes. That will be 
                                                                                                                    
 23. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 477 
(1897). 
 24. For extensive discussion of this issue, see James A. Gardner, The Regulatory Role 
of State Constitutional Structural Constraints in Presidential Elections, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 625 (2001). 
 25. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000). 
 26. Despite its sweeping language, Section 2 turned out to be toothless because nei-
ther Congress nor the courts ever showed themselves willing to pull the trigger, despite 
roughly a century of black disenfranchisement in the South. See, e.g., Lampkin v. Connor, 
360 F.2d 505 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (dismissing a Section 2 claim challenging the number of 
seats given to Southern states); George David Zuckerman, A Consideration of the History 
and Present Status of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 FORDHAM L. REV. 93 
(1961) (recounting the lack of post-ratification enforcement of Section 2 by Congress). 
 27. See U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 2. 
 28. For a recent discussion of the various devices Southern states used to disenfran-
chise black voters during the nineteenth century, see J. MORGAN KOUSSER, COLORBLIND 
INJUSTICE: MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS AND THE UNDOING OF THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION 
16-38 (1999). 
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true whether black voters are permitted to participate or not. The 
number of black voters in Mississippi has skyrocketed since the pas-
sage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which effectively reenfran-
chised African Americans. And yet, in the last nine presidential elec-
tions, despite overwhelming black support for the Democratic candi-
date, the Republicans have carried all the state’s electoral votes eight 
times.29 The same is true for South Carolina, the state with the sec-
ond-highest percentage of black residents.30 And if a state legislature 
were fairly drawn to reflect a state’s racial composition,31 and there 
were significant racial polarization, then legislative selection would 
produce the same sweep for the white-preferred candidate. A major-
ity of the legislators would represent majority-white districts and 
would vote for the white-preferred candidate. 
 By contrast, in a state where the white community was split be-
tween the two parties, and the black community was politically cohe-
sive, then the black community might be the swing vote.32 In a popu-
lar election, the black-preferred candidate would win if black votes 
plus the votes of white faction A were greater than the votes of white 
faction B.33 And if the state legislature were fairly districted (again, a 
counterfactual hypothesis), there is a reasonable probability that leg-
islative selection would produce the same result. 
 Moreover, a targeted disenfranchisement strategy might be coun-
terproductive to a state wishing to preserve white political suprem-
acy. If blacks could fully participate in every aspect of a state’s politi-
cal system other than how it selected its electors, unsuccessful white 
factions would continue to have an incentive to build political coali-
tions with the black community to gain control over the state gov-
ernment. Over time, this might either result in the reintroduction of 
popular balloting or result in legislative selection throwing the 
state’s electoral votes to the candidate supported by the biracial coa-
lition. Disenfranchisement across the board was the only stable 
                                                                                                                    
 29. See NATIONAL ARCHIVES RECORDS ADMINISTRATION, U.S. ELECTORAL COLLEGE: 
2000 ELECTION RESULTS, at http://www.nara.gov/fedreg/elctcoll/index.html (last updated 
Apr. 5, 2001) (providing state by state electoral votes). 
 30. During Reconstruction, both Mississippi and South Carolina were majority-black 
states. As long as each had a majority-black electorate, Republican candidates won all the 
states’ electoral votes. See KOUSSER, supra note 28, at 20-22, 29. 
 31. This, too, is a deeply counterfactual assumption. Many of the most heavily black 
states engaged in white-driven racial gerrymanders throughout Reconstruction. See id. at 
28-31. 
 32. I explore the conditions under which blacks can be the swing vote in Karlan, 
supra note 22, at 295. 
 33. Note that black participation is outcome-determinative only if two things are true: 
(1) the black vote is larger than the difference between the two white factions (otherwise, 
the gap between the white factions will determine the outcome) and (2) the black commu-
nity forms a coalition with the smaller of the two white factions (otherwise, the result does 
not change whether blacks participate or not). 
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strategy. Southern states pursued it ferociously and Congress and 
the courts proved themselves unwilling to pull the Section 2 trigger 
even then.34 
II.   SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND THE RIGHT TO VOTE 
 The Supreme Court has also foreclosed Shane’s other candidate 
for an express constitutional guarantee of the right to vote in presi-
dential election—the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.35 In October 1872, Virginia Minor, “a native 
born, free, white citizen of the United States, and of the State of Mis-
souri, over the age of twenty-one years, wishing to vote for electors 
for President and Vice-President of the United States,” sought to reg-
ister.36 The registrar refused her application because she was a 
woman.37 She sued, squarely pleading that voting was a privilege or 
immunity of United States citizenship protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.38 
 In Minor v. Happersett, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected 
that argument. It noted that women had always been considered citi-
zens of the United States “the same as men.”39 But, the Court con-
cluded, all citizens were not necessarily voters. At the time of the 
framing, no state had universal citizen suffrage. States commonly re-
stricted the franchise to adult, male property owners who had re-
sided in the state for a substantial period of time,40 despite the fact 
that children, women, and poor people were undeniably citizens. And 
at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, every state—
including the readmitted Southern states whose constitutions were 
reviewed by the Reconstruction Congress—continued to restrict the 
franchise to adult males.41 Thus, the common understanding of citi-
zenship, the Court suggested, was not coextensive with voting. If the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause did not protect Virginia Minor’s 
ability to vote in the 1872 presidential election, it is unclear why it 
would protect anyone else’s right to vote, let alone anyone’s right to 
have an election in which to vote. 
                                                                                                                    
 34. See supra note 26. 
 35. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States”). See Shane, supra 
note 1, at 546-47. 
 36. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 163 (1874). 
 37. Id. at 163-64.  
 38. Id. at 164. Happersett, the registrar who refused to enroll Mrs. Minor, did not 
even bother to retain a lawyer to represent him in the Supreme Court. See id.  
 39. Id. at 169. 
 40. See id. at 172-73 (describing the original states’ restrictions on the franchise). 
 41. Id. at 176-77. 
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 In contrast to Shane, the Minor Court thought that Section 2 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment actually undercut the idea of voting as a 
privilege or immunity of citizenship: 
[I]f suffrage was necessarily one of the absolute rights of citizen-
ship, why confine the operation of the [reduction of representation 
provision] to male inhabitants? Women and children are, as we 
have seen, “persons.” They are counted in the enumeration upon 
which the apportionment is to be made, but if they were necessar-
ily voters because of their citizenship unless clearly excluded, why 
inflict the penalty for the exclusion of males alone? Clearly, no 
such form of words would have been selected to express the idea 
here indicated if suffrage was the absolute right of all citizens.42 
Minor v. Happersett ended with a Court “unanimously of the opinion 
that the Constitution of the United States does not confer the right of 
suffrage upon any one.”43 And yet, as Shane notes, “the plain democ-
ratic trajectory of constitutional development since 1868”44 rejects 
that consensus. That is why the per curiam’s assertions in Bush v. 
Gore are so jarring: they are completely out of step with the Court’s 
general jurisprudence. 
 Indeed, the per curiam’s citation of Article II as giving state legis-
latures plenary power over how presidential electors are selected45 
cannot be taken at face value. Even under the most robust interpre-
tation, a state’s Article II powers are constrained by later constitu-
tional amendments. After the Nineteenth Amendment, the states 
cannot strip women and women alone of the right to vote in presiden-
tial elections.46 After the Twenty-sixth Amendment, they cannot de-
cide to exclude the elderly from voting in presidential elections.47 And 
the Equal Protection Clause constrains the states in a variety of 
ways: they cannot establish a popular balloting process that weighs 
the votes of some voters more heavily than others (Bush v. Gore itself 
suggests this equal protection constraint)48 or restrict the popular 
franchise to longstanding state residents. Nor, under the suspect-
classification strand of equal protection doctrine, could a state legis-
lature adopt a process for picking electors because of its adverse ef-
fects upon a suspect or quasi-suspect class.49 Under contemporary 
doctrine, the Equal Protection Clause would forbid a state from abol-
                                                                                                                    
 42. Id. at 174-75. 
 43. Id. at 178. 
 44. Shane, supra note 1, at 548. 
 45. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000).  
 46. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, cl. 1.  
 47. See id. amend. XXVI, § 1. 
 48. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 104.  
 49. See Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). 
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ishing popular elections if the change were motivated by the desire to 
“maintai[n] white control of presidential elector appointments.”50 
 Moreover, the enforcement clauses of the Reconstruction and later 
voting-related amendments give Congress power under appropriate 
circumstances to override a state’s sovereign prerogatives.51 To take 
just one salient example, section 5 of the Voting Rights Act forbids 
certain covered jurisdictions from adopting any change with respect 
to voting if that change would have a retrogressive effect on minority 
voting rights.52 The Supreme Court has explicitly held that abolish-
ing elections and replacing them with appointive systems is covered 
by section 5: “In [this case], an important county officer in certain 
counties was made appointive instead of elective. The power of a citi-
zen’s vote is affected by this amendment; after the change, he is pro-
hibited from electing an officer formerly subject to the approval of the 
voters.”53 Thus, if a covered jurisdiction (like Mississippi or Arizona) 
were to abolish popular election, under section 5 it would first have 
to prove that the change had neither the purpose nor the effect of 
diminishing the voting power of African-American, Hispanic, or Na-
tive-American citizens.54 
 The second part of Disappearing Democracy, which focuses on 
procedural due process, is both perceptive and persuasive. Shane 
surely is right that voting is a species of liberty interest.55 But the 
implications of his own analysis, as well as the democratic trajectory 
of constitutional development, raise important questions about the 
contours of the right to vote. And they suggest a substantive, as well 
as a procedural, due process component to the right to vote. 
 To begin with, Shane draws too sharp a distinction between equal 
protection- and due process-based analyses of claims about voting. As 
I have explained elsewhere,56 the Court’s pronouncements about vot-
ing rights are often “double-barrelled,” reflecting judicial skepticism 
about a state’s restrictions of the franchise under both the suspect-
classification and the fundamental-rights strands of strict scrutiny. 
The paradigmatic example of such a case is Harper v. State Board of 
                                                                                                                    
 50. Shane, supra note 1, at 544. 
 51. See U.S CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; id. amend. XV, § 2; id. amend. XIX, cl. 2; id. 
amend. XXIII, § 2; id. amend. XXIV, § 2; id. amend. XXVI, § 2. 
 52. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994). For a full treatment of section 5, which is a very complex 
statute, see THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY, supra note *, at 546-671. 
 53. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 569-70 (1969). 
 54. There are some jurisdictions—Florida is one of them, see 28 C.F.R. pt. 51 app. 
(2000)—which are only partially covered. The question whether preclearance would apply 
to them is somewhat knottier, see Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 271-77 (1999) 
(addressing this issue in the context of changes to how California, also a partially covered 
state, elects municipal judges), but my own view is that it would. 
 55. See Shane, supra note 1, at 562-63.  
 56. See Pamela S. Karlan, Just Politics?: Five Not So Easy Pieces of the 1995 Term, 34 
HOUS. L. REV. 289, 297-99 (1997). 
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Elections,57 which struck down poll taxes as a violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause. The Court offered two now distinct reasons for its 
conclusion. First, it described the right to vote as “a fundamental 
matter in a free and democratic society”; thus, “any alleged infringe-
ment . . . must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.”58 Second, it 
found that “[l]ines drawn on the basis of wealth or property, like 
those of race, are traditionally disfavored”; thus, “the requirement of 
fee paying causes an ‘invidious’ discrimination.”59 In hindsight, the 
first line of cases lead to the current black letter law that the right to 
vote is a fundamental right, while the second line is an evolutionary 
dead end. But before it petered out, the suspect-classification argu-
ment may have contributed to the Court’s adoption of a fundamental 
rights perspective—the importance of protecting the right to vote 
was driven home by the invidiousness of the distinction that kept 
some citizens from the polls.60 
 While the Court pigeonholes fundamental rights cases as raising 
equal protection claims, it could just as easily have denominated 
them as substantive due process claims. A number of scholars have 
suggested that the Court’s entire equal protection jurisprudence in 
the area of voting rights may be little more than a Warren Court re-
casting of substantive due process concerns in more palatable doc-
trinal language.61 The Court has certainly termed the right to vote 
                                                                                                                    
 57. 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
 58. Id. at 667 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964)). 
 59. Id. at 668 (citation omitted). 
 60. I also think Shane may have conflated two different areas of equal protection doc-
trine related to voting. In addition to applying a conventional kind of equal protection 
analysis, the Court has developed doctrines of equal protection in the political arena that 
have no counterpart elsewhere. The most salient example is the “one-person, one-vote” 
standard. Because the one-person, one-vote cases treat the right to vote as fundamental, 
avoidable population deviations trigger heightened scrutiny. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 
377 U.S. 533 (1964). In a unique formulation, the state must show that the disparities are 
“necessary to achieve some legitimate goal.” Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 731 (1983) 
(emphasis added). This test blends the permissible-ends language from rationality review 
cases with the appropriate-means language from strict scrutiny. Moreover, there is no re-
quirement in one-person, one-vote cases that the plaintiffs show that the population devia-
tions were the product of intentional discrimination against a group of voters. Cf. James U. 
Blacksher & Larry T. Menefee, From Reynolds v. Sims to City of Mobile v. Bolden: Have 
the White Suburbs Commandeered the Fifteenth Amendment?, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1982) 
(noting the irony that malapportionment claims brought by white suburbanites face a 
lower standard of proof than racial vote dilution claims brought by black voters). 
 Thus, I disagree with Shane as to the relevance of the fact that Bush v. Gore involved “no 
allegation that any [of the differential treatments of ballots] amounted to an intentionally 
invidious discriminatory practice—the kind of practice that the Court normally requires 
before it elevates the intensity of its constitutional scrutiny of state practices under the 
Equal Protection Clause.” Shane, supra note 1, at 552. The redistricting cases on which the 
Bush v. Gore Court relied did not require any proof of intentional invidious discrimination. 
That “unconstitutional classification” equal protection claims require proof of intent is ar-
guably beside the point. 
 61. See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, Untangling the Standards of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 
MICH. L. REV. 981, 1068 (1979). For the best extended discussion of how the Court has 
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“fundamental,”62 and has held that infringements on the right are 
subject to strict scrutiny.63 
 The now constitutionally recognized fundamentality of the right to 
vote is relevant to the question raised in Disappearing Democracy in 
two respects. First, as Shane recognizes, the importance of the right 
to vote informs the operation of the three-part procedural due process 
calculus of Mathews v. Eldridge 64 by putting a heavy thumb on the 
side of requiring more reliable procedures.65 A critical flaw in the Su-
preme Court’s decision is that it in fact fails to vindicate any identifi-
able voter’s interest in having her ballot counted.66 
 Second, the substantive strand of the Due Process Clause goes be-
yond requiring fair procedures to “barring certain government ac-
tions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement 
them.”67 If the right to vote is now understood as a fundamental as-
pect of the liberty the Due Process Clause protects—and the Court 
has recognized that analysis of liberty interests is deeply informed by 
tradition, as reflected in longstanding federal and state practices68—
then a Court sensitive to our traditions of ordered liberty should find 
a substantive liberty interest in voting to elect the President. That 
interest, as it has evolved and solidified, outweighs an Article II in-
terest in replacing popular election with some other method of select-
                                                                                                                    
commingled and confused various doctrinal strands, see James A. Gardner, Liberty, Com-
munity and the Constitutional Structure of Political Influence: A Reconsideration of the 
Right to Vote, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 893 (1997). 
 62. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972); Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562; 
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886). 
 63. See Dunn, 405 U.S. at 337. 
 64. 424 U.S. 319, 332-49 (1976). 
 65. See Shane, supra note 1, at 564-66. 
 66. I disagree with Shane on one subsidiary point, though. He sees Al Gore as an ap-
propriate plaintiff in a due process lawsuit and “elide[s] . . . the question of a candidate’s 
standing.” Shane, supra note 1, at 562 n.125. I think, for reasons I discuss elsewhere, that 
using the candidates as the vehicles for assessing what ultimately are the voters’ claims 
may divert judicial attention from the proper remedial questions. I argue that George W. 
Bush, for example, was precisely the wrong person to vindicate voters’ equal protection in-
terests because his own remedial desire was to see the manual recounts stopped altogether 
(since he was ahead), regardless of how many votes remained uncounted. See Pamela S. 
Karlan, Nothing Personal: The Evolution of the Newest Equal Protection from Shaw v. 
Reno to Bush v. Gore, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1345 (2001). 
 67. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986). 
 68. The most elegant expression of this insight appears in Justice Harlan’s dissent in 
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-43 (1961): 
 Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot be de-
termined by reference to any code. The best that can be said is that through the 
course of this Court’s decisions it has represented the balance which our Na-
tion, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck 
between that liberty and the demands of organized society . . . , having regard 
to what history teaches are the traditions from which it developed as well as 
the traditions from which it broke. That tradition is a living thing. 
See also, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992) (opinion of O’Connor, 
Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) (adopting Justice Harlan’s formulation). 
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ing electors that over the last two centuries has fallen into desue-
tude. The Fourteenth Amendment has simply evolved beyond the 
point at which a state can strip citizens of their right to participate in 
choosing the President. 
 The Court’s voting cases do, however, raise a complicating factor 
for procedural due process analysis. Put simply, the Court has never 
precisely defined the “right to vote” to which strict scrutiny applies. 
Strict scrutiny, if applied across the board, would invalidate many 
practices that courts have consistently upheld, from somewhat re-
strictive registration requirements69 and absentee-ballot laws to bans 
on write-in voting70 and other sorts of limitations on ballot access.71 
Instead, what the Court has done, in effect, is to recognize two sorts 
of “right to vote”: a “core” right to which strict scrutiny attaches and 
a less fundamental “right to vote” to which a shifting-scale sort of in-
termediate scrutiny applies. In cases that fall in this second category, 
the Court asks whether a sufficiently weighty state interest is served 
by a reasonable and nondiscriminatory restriction on voters or vot-
ing.72  
 The case law, it turns out, does not give real guidance on a critical 
question in Bush v. Gore for any form of due process analysis: what 
are the rights of voters who cast ballots that do not comply with state 
law? Many of the Justices were skeptical that a voter who failed to 
punch the chad out completely had cast a legal vote in the first 
place.73 If the votes that machine counts failed to pick up were not le-
gally cast as a matter of Florida law, then a state’s decision to use a 
tabulation process that fails to capture them arguably causes no due 
process problem, since no state-created liberty interest is implicated. 
My own view, which Shane shares, is that, as a matter of Florida 
law, the “clear intent of the voter” standard meant that many of the 
ballots that were out of strict compliance with Florida law were 
nonetheless legal votes. Thus, for me, the due process analysis pro-
ceeds as Shane suggests. But it is important at least to notice the 
countervailing position: if ballots with pregnant or dimpled chads or 
                                                                                                                    
 69. See, e.g., Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679, 679-81 (1973) (upholding Arizona’s deci-
sion to cut off registration fifty days before state and local elections, despite the fact that 
for federal elections only a thirty-day cutoff is permitted, see 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1 (1994)). 
 70. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992) (upholding Hawaii’s refusal to count 
write-in votes). 
 71. For a fuller treatment of these cases, see THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY, supra note *, 
at 362-73, 418-27. 
 72. See Timmons v. New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 357-59 (1997) (describing the standard). 
 73. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 119 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Scalia & 
Thomas, JJ., concurring). At oral argument, Justice O’Connor also expressed this concern: 
“[W]hy isn’t the standard [for deciding if a ballot contains a legal vote] the one that voters 
are instructed to follow, for goodness sakes? I mean, it couldn’t be clearer. I mean, why 
don’t we go to that standard?” Tr. of Oral Argument at 58, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) 
(No. 00-949), available at http://election2000.stanford.edu/949trans.pdf. 
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other forms of noncompliance do not contain legally cast votes, then a 
recount process that includes them might infringe upon the voting 
rights of those citizens who did comply with the state’s require-
ments.74 
 This sentiment may well have played some role in the Court’s de-
cision. That is, the Court might have decided the equal protection 
claim the way that it did only because it thought there was little risk 
of there being a meaningful number of uncounted but legal votes or 
because it thought that the Florida process was so out of control that 
it was likely to produce a less fair final accounting. I think those as-
sumptions are wrong. I suspect that the Court’s willingness to in-
dulge in either might be a manifestation of what Paul Brest memo-
rably termed “selective sympathy and indifference.”75 That is, the five 
Justices in the majority might have been affected by the fact that the 
voters whose votes were not being included were Democrats who 
simply couldn’t follow the rules, for goodness sakes!, and were being 
bailed out by a Democrat-dominated state supreme court. Without 
some substantive conception of the right to vote, then, pure proce-
dural due process theory can only take us part of the way toward ex-
plaining why the Supreme Court’s equal protection decision is so 
bankrupt. 
III.   DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION AS RHETORICAL 
STRATEGIES 
 There was another due process claim lurking in Bush v. Gore. As 
Shane notes, Governor Bush also argued that the manual recounts 
ordered by the Florida Supreme Court violated the Due Process 
Clause.76 That claim was never really addressed, at least as a matter 
of due process. But it was embraced de facto by the Chief Justice and 
Justices Scalia and Thomas, whose Article II-based concurrence of-
fered a presidential election-specific version of the argument that 
changing electoral rules in midstream is unconstitutionally unfair to 
candidates and voters.77 
 I don’t propose to analyze Bush’s due process claim here. Rick 
Pildes’s Article contains a discussion that reflects our collaboratively 
                                                                                                                    
 74. See Roe v. Alabama, 43 F.3d 574, 581 (11th Cir. 1995) (counting absentee ballots 
that did not strictly comply with various requirements of Alabama law would “dilute the 
votes of those voters who met the requirements of [the absentee ballot law] as well as those 
voters who actually went to the polls on election day”). 
 75. Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 7 (1976). 
 76. Shane, supra note 1, at 570.  
 77. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 112-15. 
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developed perspective.78 Faced with an unprecedented situation and 
an ambiguous and contradictory statute, it would be difficult for any 
interpretation of state constitutional law to rise to the level of a due 
process violation. Rather, I want to consider why, with all these Due 
Process Clause claims in the air, the Court employed the Equal Pro-
tection Clause instead. 
 Disappearing Democracy suggests the beginning of the answer: 
any reference to due process could have made it uncomfortably clear 
that the Court was “apply[ing] the Equal Protection Clause in a way 
that [would] disenfranchise thousands of Florida voters.”79 Only by 
ignoring the substantive content of the right to vote and focusing in-
stead solely on the comparative treatment of ballots could the Court 
reach its desired outcome. 
 But the problems with the per curiam go beyond that. In the end, 
the decision to stop the recount had virtually nothing to do with 
equal protection. It vindicated no identifiable voter’s interests.80 The 
form of equality it created was empty: it treated all voters whose bal-
lots had not already been tabulated the same, by denying any of 
them the ability to have his ballot counted.81 And its remedy per-
petuated other forms of inequality that were far more severe: be-
tween voters whose ballots were counted by the machine count and 
voters whose ballots were not, and even between voters in counties 
that performed timely manual recounts (like Volusia and Broward) 
and voters in other counties. 
 Even if there had been an equal protection problem with aspects 
of the procedure ordered by the Florida Supreme Court, that would 
not have justified the remedy the U.S. Supreme Court ordered. To 
stop the recount, the per curiam essentially smuggled in through the 
back door the Article II rationale advanced explicitly by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s concurrence: any constitutionally acceptable recount 
would require disregarding the Florida Legislature’s presumed inter-
est in obtaining the safe-harbor benefits of the Electoral Count Act.82 
So why did the per curiam insist on relying on the Equal Protection 
Clause? 
 I think the decision was political, in the broad sense of the word. 
The Court was trying to wrap its decision in the mantle of its most 
popularly and jurisprudentially successful intervention into the po-
                                                                                                                    
 78. See Richard H. Pildes, Judging “New Law” in Election Disputes, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 691 (2001). See generally WHEN ELECTIONS GO BAD, supra note *, at 5-19. 
 79. Shane, supra note 1, at 538. 
 80. For a full discussion of this point, see Karlan, supra note 66; see also Pamela S. 
Karlan, Equal Protection: Bush v. Gore and the Making of a Precedent, in THE UNFINISHED 
ELECTION OF 2000, at 159, 185-93 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 2001). 
 81. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 110-11. 
 82. Id. at 111-15 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
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litical process: the one-person, one-vote cases. This is a familiar 
strategy. Consider Planned Parenthood v. Casey,83 the case in which 
the Court reaffirmed the central right to reproductive autonomy rec-
ognized in Roe v. Wade.84 The joint opinion written by Justices 
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter invoked another iconic Equal Protec-
tion Clause case, Brown v. Board of Education.85 It too treated the 
responsibility of articulating binding principles of constitutional law 
as an unsought responsibility. And it saw a special dimension “pre-
sent whenever the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution calls the 
contending sides of a national controversy to end their national divi-
sion by accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution.”86 It 
identified only two such occasions “in our lifetime, . . . the decisions of 
Brown and Roe.”87 
 Perhaps the Supreme Court saw Bush v. Gore as a third such oc-
casion. Once again, the Court was asking the nation to end its close 
division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution 
and accepting a judicial resolution.88 And as between the Equal Pro-
tection Clause—source of some of the Supreme Court’s finest mo-
ments—and the other contenders, it was no contest. If the Supreme 
Court was going to stop the recount, it had to use a constitutional 
provision with a pedigree. The Equal Protection Clause provided ex-
actly that. Moreover, it allowed the Court to invoke the specter of un-
fair treatment of voters, whereas the other available constitutional 
contenders protected either the prerogative of state legislatures (Ar-
ticle II, Section 1) or, even worse, the interests of candidate George 
W. Bush (the Due Process Clause as it was actually raised in Bush v. 
Gore). 
CONCLUSION 
 Shane concludes his Article with a discussion of the political ques-
tion doctrine. He argues that “Article II and the Twelfth Amendment 
are readily interpretable as embodying a textually demonstrable 
commitment to Congress of the power to resolve all issues related to 
the proper tabulation of electoral votes.”89 While I agree with him 
that the Constitution confides the question of how to count electoral 
votes to Congress, I do not think that necessarily makes Bush v. Gore 
nonjusticiable. Even if the question of which slate of electors to ac-
cept is ultimately for Congress to decide, that cannot dispose of the 
                                                                                                                    
 83. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 84. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 85. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 86. Casey, 505 U.S. at 867. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110 (2000).  
 89. Shane, supra note 1, at 581-82. 
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antecedent question of whether a state has conducted its election 
process in compliance with the Equal Protection and Due Process 
Clauses. I imagine that Shane would be disturbed if, faced with the 
due process claim he identifies—the hypothetical case of Gore v. Har-
ris—the Supreme Court were to say to excluded voters, “go complain 
to Congress; we are unwilling to step in even if a state chooses to use 
unreliable methods of counting votes.” 
 Disappearing Democracy is ultimately an Article about why it 
matters through which lens we examine a problem. As Shane notes, 
it isn’t just a question of vocabulary.90 It actually affects how courts 
see the facts and resolve the issues. But just as how we denominate a 
claim can matter, so too can what we call an institution. 
 We are not the only country recently to have faced the question 
whether we could hold our presidential inauguration as scheduled. 
Iran also had that problem. Its inauguration was postponed because 
the Iranian Constitution requires that the ceremony be carried out in 
the presence of “all the members” of the Guardians Council, and the 
reformist parliament was at loggerheads with the conservative judi-
ciary over voting to fill the vacant seats.91 The Iranian Constitution 
provides for something our Constitution doesn’t: an “Expediency 
Council.”92 Faced with the problem, the Expediency Council simply 
rammed through a settlement: the seats would be filled by a plurality 
vote, rather than the previously required majority vote, and the in-
auguration could go forward. Our Constitution makes no mention of 
an Expediency Council. Both in describing the right to vote in presi-
dential elections and in reviewing how Florida sought to protect that 
right, our Supreme Court acted more like an Expediency Council 
than a principled judicial body. Ultimately, it denied all of us due 
process of law. 
                                                                                                                    
 90. See id. at 551-52. 
 91. For an account of this controversy, see Neil MacFarquhar, Iran Parliament Clears 
Way for Khatami’s 2nd Inauguration, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2001, at A3. 
 92. Id.  
